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Public Contracts-A New Right for an Unsuccessful Bidder
A disappointed low bidder on a federal government contract
brought suit to recover lost profits and expenditures made in
preparing his bid. The bids had been solicited under The Armed
Services Procurement Act of 1947 which directs that contracts
shall be awarded " ... to that responsible bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation for bids, will be most advantageous to
the Government, price and other factors considered: Provided,
That all bids may be rejected when the agency head determines
that it is in the public interest so to do." 1 Seven bids were entered
and the contract awarded to the highest bidder. Plaintiff showed
that independent tests found plaintiff's product met specifications
as well as the successful high bidder's product, and also that the
same situation had occurred before with the same bidders involved. The government agency awarded the contract on the
grounds that the successful bidder was the only one meeting
specifications. In the Court of Claims held: Where the government
does not invite bids in good faith but invites bids with intent
wilfully, arbitrarily, and capriciously to disregard its obligation
to accept the bid most advantageous to the government, the expenses of preparing such bid may be recovered on the theory that
the government impliedly warrants honest consideration of bids
submitted.2
The most interesting facet of this case is that it allows a new
form of recovery to an unsuccessful bidder. Historically, the unsuccessful bidder has had little success in court.3 This is particularly

1 The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 62 Stat. 21, 41 U.S.C.§
152 (b) (1952).
2 Heyer Products Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (1956).
3 Exemplary of the holdings on the subject is the following: "The mandamus, being brought solely in behalf of the petitioners, it was incumbent
upon them to allege a special pecuniary interest in the matter, showing
a clear legal right to the relief asked, which they did not and cannot do,
for the reason that the rejection of their bid did not give them any private
right which they could enforce by mandamus or otherwise. This is for two
reasons: (1) Because the advertisement was not an offer of a contract, but
an offer to receive proposals for a contract, and (2) because the statute
requiring that contracts be let to the lowest and best bidder was designed
for the benefit and protection of the public and not the bidders." State
ex rel. Johnson v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 483, 485, 98 S.W.2d 677, 679 (1936) overruling State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 183 Mo. App. 463, 167
S.W. 1123 (1914) and State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Bourne, 151 Mo.
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evident in cases against state and federal instrumentalities, as opposed to municipalities. 4 The general theory denying recovery to an
unsuccessful bidder is that no vested legal right in the bidder, which
would give rise to a cause of action, has been infringed. In applying
this theory, the courts have voiced a number of reasons for their reluctance to find a cause of action. The most prevalent reasons are
(1) a contract was never consummated, thus failure of performance
on either side would not evoke an actionable right for breach,0 and
(2) statutes governing the award of bids are enacted for the benefit
of the public and not the bidders, thus a failure to follow the mandates of the statute conferred no actionable right upon the bidder.fl
Some other reasons have been the judicial reluctance to interfere

App. 104, 131 S.W. 896 (1910). Also: Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S.
113 (1914); Wooldridge Mfg. Co. v. U.S. 235 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Fulton Iron Co. v. Larson, 171 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Colorado Paving
Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (8th Cir. 1897); Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235,
11 S.W.2d 278 (1928); State ex rel. Doniphan State Bank v. Harris, 265
Mo. 190, 176 S.W. 9 (1915); Anderson v. Public Schools, 122 Mo. 61, 27 S.W.
· 610 (1894); State ex rel. State Journal Co. v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386, 3 S.W.
846 (1886); State ex rel. Nebraska Bldg. and Inv. Co. v. Board of Commissioners. 105 Neb. 570, 181 N.W. 530 (1921). Contra, Brown v. City of Phoenbc,
77 Ariz. 368, 272 P.2d 358 (1954); St. Landry Lumber Co. v. Town of Bunkie,
155 La. 892, 99 So. 687 (1924) ; Fourmy v. Town of Franklin, 126 La. 151, 52
So. 249 (1910); State v. York County, 13 Neb. 57, 12 N.W. 816 (1882) (statute conferred ministerial duty only); Sellitto v. Cedar Grove Township,
132 N.J.L. 29, 38 A.2d 185 (1944); Peterson Contracting Co. v. City of
Hackensack, 99 N.J.L. 260, 122 Atl. 741 (1923) (statutes construed to be for
protection of bidders); State ex rel. United District Heating, Inc., v. State
Office Bldg. Comm'n, 124 Ohio St. 413, 179 N.E. 138 (1931).
4 The reason for this is that unsuccessful bidders have frequently brought
their actions in the form of a taxpayer's suit. While a taxpayer normally
has a cause of action against a municipality, he does not generally have
one against the federal government under the doctrine of Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Cf. representative taxpayer suits: O'Brien v.
Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D.C. Mass. 1934) ; Colorado Paving Co. v. Murphy,
78 Fed. 28 (8th Cir. 1897); Adolphus v. Baskin, 95 Fla. 603 116 So. 225
(1928); Seysler v. Mowery, 29 Idaho 412, 160 Pac. 262 (1916); Barber County
v. Smith, 48 Kan. 331, 29 Pac. 565 (1892); Hutchinson v. Skinner, 21 Misc.
729, 49 N.Y.S. 360 (1897); City of Tacoma v. Bridges, 25 Wash. 221, 65 Pac.
186 (1901); Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067 (1891).
5 O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp. 761 (D.C. Mass. 1934) ; Commissioners ex
rel. Snyder v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 343 (1876); Heffner v. Commissioners, 28
Pa. 108 (1857).
6 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); American Smelting
and Refining Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 75 (1921); United States v. New
York and Puerto Rico Steamship Co., 239 U.S. 88 (1915); Colorado Paving
Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (8th Cir. 1897); O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp.
761 (D.C. Mass. 1934).
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with administrative activities7 and the fear that to entertain such
suits would unnecessarily clog the courts.8 In the present case, the
court expressly recognizes and approves of the first two reasons.
However, the court holds that beyond these theories ~n unsuccessful
bidder, at least in a suit against the federal government, has another basis for establishing his cause of action, i.e., that one who
bids for a contract of the federal government has a right to have
his bid honestly considered. This right being present, an implied
promise of fair consideration respecting bids submitted accompanies every invitation for bids. An implied contract arises upon
the submission of the bid which is breached by failure of the administrative agency to give fair consideration to the bid. From the
breach of this implied contract, the unsuccessful bidder's cause
of action arises and he may recover the expenses of preparing
his bid. As a result of this unprecedented reasoning, the decision
in the Heyer case is unique among the unsuccessful bidder cases.
The conventional actions potentially available to the unsuccessful bidder are mandamus to compel award of the contract,
mandamus to compel readvertising for bids, injunction to stay
award of the contract, and a contract action for damages for loss
of profits. The first three actions are governed by the varying
statutory provisions relating to the award of public contracts.
The first problem met in the mandamus actions is whether the
government officer authorized to award the contract is granted discretion in making the award. If a strictly ministerial duty involving
no discretion is present, the unsuccessful low bidder normally
acquires a cause of action and may recover. 9 If some discretion
is allowed by the statute, the unsuccessful bidder normally
may not recover. 10 The courts have been extremely liberal in
discovering authority for discretionary action under the statutes,
holding provisions which require an award to "lowest respon7 See Comment, 44 Yale L.J. 149 (1934):
s Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 (1914).
oState ex rel. Woodruff-Dunlap Pririting Co. v. Cornell, 52 Neb. 25,
71 N.W. 961 (1897); State ex rel. Whedon v. York County, 13 Neb. 57, 12
N.W. 816 (1882).
10 United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.s: 218 (1913); State
ex rel. Doniphan State Bank v. Harris, 265 Mo. 190, 176 S.W. 9 (1915); State
ex rel. State Journal Co. v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386, 3 S.W. 846 (1886); State
ex rel. Nebraska Bldg. and Inv. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs. 105 Neb. 570, 181
N.W. 530 (1921); State ex rel. Union Fuel Co. v. City of Lincoln, 68 Neb.
597, 94 N.W. 719 (1903); State ex rel. Silver v. Kendall, 15 Neb. 262, 18
N.W. 85 (1883).
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sible bidder," "lowest and best bidder," 11 or allow the rejection
of all bids12 to vest a wide discretion in the administrative officials. Some jurisdictions recognize that there is a limit to the
exercise of discretion and allow review where the administrative
action has been found arbitrary or fraudulent. 13 Consequently, the
unsuccessful bidder's remedy under mandamus actions has been
extremely limited.14 By much the same reasoning, the unsuccessful
bidder has little success in maintaining an action for injunction
since he cannot show infringement of a right necessary to constitute a cause of action.15 Finally, since he cannot prove a contract,
the bidder's remedy for loss of profits is virtually non-existent. 10
To determine if the Court of Claims was wise in broadening
the restricted remedies available to the unsuccessful bidder, it
must be considered whether the policy determinations in recognizing a bidder's right to have his bid honestly considered override
11 See note 10, supra. Cf. Stanley-Taylor Co. v. San Francisco, 135 Cal.
486, 67 Pac. 783 (1902) (arbitrary action immaterial); State ex rel. Dale
v. Board of Education, 9 Ohio Dec. N.P. 336, 6 Ohio N.P. 347 (1899) (not
limited to considering pecuniary responsibility); Commissioners ex rel.
Snyder v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 343 (1876) (may consider judgment and skill,
honest mistake does not void discretion); Times Publishing Co. v. City
of Everett, 9 Wash 518, 37 Pac. 695 (1894) (bidder who brings suit as
taxpayer cannot have mandamus for arbitrary action although can have
injunction in taxpayer status).
12 Stanley-Taylor Co. v. San Francisco, 135 Cal. 486, 67 Pac. 783 (1902);
State ex rel. Globe Publishing Co. v. Saline County, 19 Neb. 253, 27 N.W.
122 (1866); State ex. rel. Shay v. McCormack, 167 App. Div. 854, 153 N.Y.
Supp. 808 (1915).
13 Lands borough v. Kelly, 1 Cal.2d 739, 37 P.2d 93 (1934) (ta."qlayer
may bring suit to control arbitrary abuse of discretion); State ex rel.
Johnson v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 618, 98 S.W.2d 677 (1936) (bidder has no
cause of action although taxpayer may sue for arbitrary abuse of discretion); State ex rel. Globe Publishing Co. v. Saline County, 19 Neb.
253, 27 N.W. 122 (1886); State ex rel. United District Heating, Inc. v.
State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 124 Ohio St. 413, 179 N.E. 138 (1931) (bidder
has cause of action and may sue for arbitrary abuse of discretion).
14 Mandamus requiring readvertising has been allowed. See People
ex rel. Hilton Bridge Constr. Co. v. Aldric!lge, 13 App. Div. 24, 43 N.Y.S.
99 (1897). For other mandamus actions see notes 15-17, infra.
15 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Colorado Paving
Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (8th ·Cir. 1897); O'Brien v. Carney, 6 F. Supp.
761 (D.C. Mass. 1934).
16 Wooldridge Mfg. Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Royal Sundries Corp. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1953);
Talbot Paving Co. v. City of Detroit, 109 Mich. 657, 67 N.W. 979 (1896);
East River Gas-Light Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N.Y. 557, 48 Sickels-(1883).
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the practical objections to such a suit. An implied promise of fair
consideration is not squarely established by any other case authority. Several cases through dictum have indicated that perhaps
there should be such a promise. 17 In addition, it might be inferred
from the statements of the Comptroller General18 and the Attorney
General1° that such a right is administratively recognized. The
strongest argument, however, is public policy.20 It is uniformly
recognized that a duty of fair consideration is owed to the general
public to prevent corruption and to insure economical spending of
the public monies. By the same token, it is submitted, without regard to whether the established practice of competitive bidding is
wise or not, fair consideration of bids is a necessity to the maintenance of the competitive bidding system. Without such an assurance of fair dealing, many bidders could become unwilling to
expend the large sums required to prepare bids. The answer to
the objections is more difficult. While the courts quite properly

11 ". • • The purpose of these statutes and regulations is to give all
persons equal right to compete for Government contracts; to prevent
unjust favoritism, or collusion or fraud in the letting of contracts for the
purchase of supplies; and thus to secure for the Government the benefits which arise from competition. In the furtherance of such purpose,
invitations and specifications must be such as to permit competitors to
compete on a common basis." United States v. Brookridge Farm Inc.,
111 F.2d 461, 463 (10th Cir. 1940) (dictum).

"It is true that there is implicit in the invitation to bid . . . an
undertaking of good faith on the part of the agency of acquisition, in
deciding whether or not to enter into a contract of purchase, once the
bids have been received and considered." Royal Sundries Corp. v. United
States, 112 F. Supp. 244, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) (dictum).

"... There must be a point of time at which discretion is exhausted.
The procedure for the advertising for bids for supplies ... to the Government would else be a mockery-a procedure, we may say, that is not
permissible but required . . . By it the Government is given the benefit
of the competition of the market and each bidder is given the chance
of a bargain. It is a provision, therefore, in the interest of both Government and bidder, necessarily giving rights to both and placing obligations
on both. And it is not out of place to say that the Government should be
animated by a justice as anxious to consider the rights of the bidder as
to insist upon its- own." United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., 249 U.S.
313, 318 (1919) (dictum).

1s 17 Comp. Gen. 554; 13 Comp. Gen. 274, 277. See Welch, The General
Accounting Office in Government Procurement, 14 Fed.B.J. 321, 327
(1954).
IO 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 555, 558 (1937).
2osee Comment, 44 Yale L.J. 149 (1934).
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are loathe to interfere in matters concerning administrative
agencies, it appears that when the agencies are unable effectively
to cope with arbitrary and capricious behavior within the scope
of their activity,21 the courts should step in to help right the wrong
if it should prove necessary. Another major argument of the courts
in denying the unsuccessful bidder suits has been the fear of a
flood of litigation that might result.22 The sheer volume of government contracts poses a tremendous problem.23 Additional checks
upon administrative agencies may help the competitive bidding system to serve its purpose more effectively. Another consideration
in allowing such suits ·appears to be whether such a suit will have
any more of a deterrent effect upon corrupt government officials
than a Congressional investigation did24 and whether the costs
of maintaining such a suit may consume any recovery which is
allowed. The answers will depend upon the circumstances of each
individual case. But, despite the fact that the remedy may not be
adequate in all cases, it appears that it should have a healthy effect
upon competitive bidding. And this new remedy to correct great
injustices to bidders should outweigh any disadvantages additional
litigation arising from this restricted remedy might produce.
It appears the Heyer case achieved a valid result. However, as
the court states, the rule of the case should be severely limited.
It should not be allowed to disturb the general theory that a bidder
has no automatic right of action whenever his bid is rejected.
Rather it should only be applied where the presence of irregular
circumstances is clearly shown. The necessary prerequisites of

21 An example is where under identical circumstances and between
the same parties as involved in the Heyer case the bid was given to the
highest bidder. A Senate committee investigated the situation and condemned the occurrence as "a shameful story." A short time later the
request for bids which gave rise to the Heyer case brought about the
same condemned situation. The annual report of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business is very revealing on this point. S. Rep. No. 1092,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
22 Comment, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 382, 389 (1955); Comment, 44 Yale L.J.
149 (1934); Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 679, 680 (1951).
23 15 billion dollars of military contracts yearly. 102 Cong. Rec. A271
(1956). ". . . Federal construction during the fiscal year 1954 will approximate 6 billion dollars. The Government of the U.S. will continue
to be the largest, most extensive, and prolific client of the construction
industry in this country." Gantt, Selected Government Contract Problems,
14 Fed.B.J. 388 (1954).
24 See generally, S. Rep. No. 1092, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
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such a suit appear to be (1) a public contract2;:; and (2) clear evidence that the administrative agency arbitrarily and capriciously
decided, prior to the opening of the bids, who would receive the
contract regardless of what each bid offered. Under such circumstances the unsuccessful bidder should be entitled to recover the
expenses of preparing his bid.
V. Thompson Snyder, '58

